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GENERAL				
	1.			
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		SOUTHEAST ASIA		
	2. 25X1A	French staff officer asserts French intend to abandon entire Tonkin delta:		
		Colonel Gracieux, General Salan's chief of staff, informed the American chargé in Saigon on 1 July that French military plans		

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call for a withdrawal to the Haiphong area and that a prolonged defense is not contemplated even then.

Gracieux said he "hoped" that forces evacuated through Haiphong could be landed near Dong Hoi in Annam, where the best defense line could be formed in the Chalk Hills running laterally toward Thakhek, Laos (see map, p. 5). He also thought that reinforcements could be brought in to this line via Thakhek. Gracieux said, however, that this regroupment must take place before 1 October, when the monsoon will make landing near Dong Hoi difficult.


Comment: The French may be expected to try to establish a line somewhere north of Tourane, the site of their best airfield in Indochina and the only one capable of supporting sustained operations of heavy, medium and jet light bombers.

3. Diem followers considering a deal with Viet Minh:

Members of Premier-designate Ngo Dinh
Diem's entourage feel that Vietnam is being
by-passed in the current Geneva negotiations and are now seriously considering an
approach to the Viet Minh,
Xuan Han, an associate of Diem, is said to be shuttling between Paris
and Geneva, where he has had talks with the pro-Viet Minh scientist
Buu Hoi.

Buu Hoi is expected in Saigon shortly, probably to serve as a go-between for Diem and the Viet Minh. Diem is opposed to partition and will press for general elections as part of a settlement.

Comment: Diem, like many anti-Communist Vietnamese, has been greatly angered by what he regards as a French sellout to the Viet Minh in Tonkin. It is quite possible that he is coming to believe that a direct Vietnam-Viet Minh settlement would prove less disadvantageous to Vietnam than to abide by France's apparent willingness to surrender Tonkin without a fight.



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·	Diem may calculate that the chances, how- ever slight, of an eventual political overthrow of the Viet Minh within a unified Vietnam are nevertheless greater than the possibility of a successful defense of the southern half of Vietnam.
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	NEAR EAST - AFRICA
5	Jordan king advises "fire on Israelis when fired on":
25X1Å	Jordan's King Hussain, in commenting on the Israeli-Jordanian hostilities in Jerusalem, told Ambassador Mallory that citizens must be protected in their homes and that he has therefore "counseled that whenever fired upon, fire should be returned."
	Mallory says this statement is counter to the caution urged by General Glubb, Arab Legion commander, who has tried to restrain the Jordanians.
v	Serious in many months. It follows the near-breakdown of the UN truce supervision machinery. While the truce will probably be restored in Palestine, the over-all picture is one of increasing deterioration.

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WESTERN EUROPE

6.	Early resignation of Italian foreign minister foreseen by Christian
25X1A	Democratic leaders:
	Former premiers De Gasperi and Fanfani have indicated in recent interviews with Ambassador Luce in Rome that they expect Foreign Minister Piccioni to leave the government shortly. De Gasperi, who said that the Chamber debate
	on EDC should start before the summer recess and not be tied to Trieste, described Piccioni as obsessed with the idea of "doing better than Pella had done re Trieste." He said that Piccioni had originally refused to sign any agreements with the United States pending a Trieste solution. Piccioni modified this stand only after Premier Scelba said he would sign a Trieste settlement if Piccioni refused.
	Comment: Piccioni is the only important Italian cabinet official opposed to reaching agreement separately on the Trieste and EDC issues. His removal from the cabinet would greatly improve the parliamentary prospects of both issues.
•	The success of the De Gasperi and Fanfani factions in winning control of the Christian Democrats at the recent party congress will probably hasten Piccioni's departure.
	LATIN AMERICA
	Venezuela angry over loss of opportunity to air Costa Rican "Communist problem":
,	Venezuelan president Perez is angry because the postponement of the OAS conference on Guatemala has denied him the opportunity to air his views on the "Communist problem" in Costa Rica before the assembled Latin American foreign ministers.
7. 5X1A	Italian cabinet official opposed to reaching agreement separately or the Trieste and EDC issues. His removal from the cabinet would greatly improve the parliamentary prospects of both issues. The success of the De Gasperi and Fanfani factions in winning control of the Christian Democrats at the recent party congress will probably hasten Piccioni's departure LATIN AMERICA Venezuela angry over loss of opportunity to air Costa Rican "Commnist problem": Venezuelan president Perez is angry been the postponement of the OAS conference Guatemala has denied him the opportunity to air Costa Rican "Communist problem":

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The strong Venezuelan reaction is attributable in part to the American decision to ship arms to Costa Rica. The Venezuelan ambassador in Washington has been instructed to protest the postponement to the Department of State.

Comment: Caracas originally opposed OAS discussion of the Guatemalan problem because it felt a consultative meeting would jeopardize Venezuelan plans to provoke a revolution in Costa Rica.

Long-standing Costa Rican fear of such a move was heightened on 22 June when a Venezuelan plane dropped scurrilous leaflets over the Costa Rican capital. The Costa Ricans feel vulnerable and have sought American support. The Costa Rican government is anti-Communist.

		president	warns	that	Guatemalan	situation	remains
25X1A	critical:						

	Nicaraguan president Somoza told Ambassador Whelan on 1 July that the situation in Guatemala is still critical. He said two Guatemalan Communists were
directing armed civilia Communism from Gua ple realize."	ans in guerrilla warfare and that eliminating temala will be "a tougher job than most peo-

Somoza believes that Castillo Armas should head the new government and added that if he later becomes "too ambitious," Somoza can "take care of him."

Comment: Sporadic Communist-incited violence has been reported since 1 July on the Guatemalan Pacific slopes, where Communists have been most effective in the past two years in conditioning the mestizo farm hands to violent action. Though the possibility of continued violence in this area cannot be eliminated, the return of army units from the front subsequent to the signing of the peace agreement on 2 July should provide sufficient armed strength to restore order in the affected area. Early on 2 July Guatemalan junta member Lt. Colonel Cruz minimized the seriousness of this violence.

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Although Colonel Monzon temporarily heads the new junta established in the 2 July agreement with Castillo Armas, the latter appears to be in the stronger position. It has not yet become evident, however, which leader will command the loyalty of the majority of the army officers.

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